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 This article reviews the interpretation of the Constitutional Court (the 
Court) on the Article 28J paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution by 
looking into the rulings related to the Information and Electronic 
Transaction Law. These rulings are chosen because, in those rulings, 
tensions between individual and public interest are apparent. For 
example, the tension between the right to privacy and freedom of 
expression, and the tensions between freedom of expression and public 
order. The rulings that will be studied in this writing are Ruling No. 
50/PUU-VI/2008, Ruling No. 2/PUU-VII/2009, Ruling No. 5/PUU-
VIII/2010, Ruling No. 52/PUU-XI/2013, and Ruling No. 20/PUU-
XIV/2016. In studying those rulings, this article use a legal method 
namely the interpretation of arguments, e.g. what are the arguments 
provided by the claimants in the case in relation to the Article 28J 
paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution and how does the Court responds 
to such arguments. Additionally, this writing will also compare the 
rulings to each other to portray the “variety” of interpretation by the 
Court over the time. Furthermore, this article will compare the Article 
28J paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution and the Court’s interpretation 
of it to other standards of limitation in other human rights instruments 
such as European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in order to depict 
what are the distinctive features of limitation of rights in Indonesian 
regime in comparison to other regimes. Last but not least, this article 
analyze what are the lesson learned from studying the Court’s 
interpretation and the possible consequence of such interpretation to the 
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1.  Introduction  
The human rights provisions were embedded in the 1945 Constitution (hereinafter, 
“the Constitution”) in the second amendment of the 1945 Constitution. In discussing 
the provisions, those who involved in the amendment process were inspired by the 
international human rights instruments specifically Universal Declaration of Human 
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Rights.1 Nevertheless, unlike the international human rights instruments, those who 
involved in the amendment wanted that Indonesia has distinctive human rights regime 
from the others.2 In doing so, one of the way making the human rights regime in 
Indonesia distinctive is by adding Article 28J especially its paragraph (2) (hereinafter, 
“Article 28J para. (2)”) to the Constitution.3 Article 28J para. (2) of the Constitution 
applies as the general rule to limit the human rights provisions in the Constitution and 
any human rights provision in Indonesian legal context for that matter. The application 
of Article 28J para. (2) of the Constitution as a general rule is to be found in the rulings 
of the Constitutional Court of Indonesia (hereinafter, “the Court”). This writing then 
will study what constitutes as the limitation of rights in Indonesian legal context by 
perusing the Court rulings in order to see the Court’s interpretation on the Article 28J 
para. (2) of the Constitution.  
There are three reasons why the Court’s interpretation on Article 28J para. (2) of the 
Constitution become the focus of this writing. Those three reasons are the paramount 
role of the Court in Indonesia, the significant importance of Article 28J para. (2) of the 
Constitution especially in terms of human rights protection, and the possible 
consequences of having the Article 28J para. (2) of the Constitution itself.  
First of all, the Court’s pivotal role in interpreting the 1945 Constitution. As stipulated 
in the Article 24C para. (1) of the Constitution, the Court is the one state body that has 
a legitimate power to interpret the Constitution through the constitutional review 
presented before the Court. In exercising its power, the Court has the aim to safeguard 
the Constitution itself and protect the constitutional rights of Indonesian people.4 That 
being said, through that interpretation of Article 28J para. (2) of the Constitution –or 
any interpretation for that matter– the Court works toward upholding the 
constitutional values. Even more, the Court furthers the importance of democracy of 
Indonesia. Therefore, take into account both the significant importance of Article 28J 
para. (2) of the Constitution and the role of the Court itself, it is important to study how 
does the Court interprets the Article 28J para. (2) of the Constitution. 
Furthermore, the significant importance of the Article 28J para. (2) of the Constitution 
itself. The Article has a significant importance in a sense that this Article, as far as the 
rulings from the Court concern, becomes the general rule in limiting rights in 
Indonesia5 and as such, the interpretation of the Article will influence the way that 
policymakers and law enforcers in balancing the existing rights in Indonesia. However, 
the interpretation of the Article will also provide a possible room for abusive power or 
human rights violation if such interpretation is not understood correctly.  
Last but not least, the reason why it is important to study how does the Court 
interprets the Article 28J para. (2) of the Constitution is that the possible consequences 
of having a general rule to limit human rights provisions -at least the provisions that 
stipulated in the 1945 Constitution after the second amendment- in the light of 
furthering human right protection in Indonesia. The general rule here is the Article 28J 
para. (2) of the Constitution. The possible consequences such as abuse of power or 
																																								 																				
1  Sekretariat Jenderal Mahkamah Konstitusi. (2010). Naskah Komprehensif Perubahan Undang-Undang 
Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945: Buku VIII Warga Negara dan Penduduk, Hak Asasi Manusia 
dan Agama. Jakarta: Sekretariat Jenderal Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, p. 280-281. 
2  Id. 
3  Id, p. 344-345 and p. 362. 
4  Asshiddiqie, J. (2008). Menuju Negara Hukum yang Demokratis. Jakarta: Sekretaris Jenderal dan 
Kepaniteraan Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, p. 39. 
5  See further Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia, Ruling 2-3/PUU-V/2007, p. 412-413. 
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human rights violation could occur if the interpretation of Article 28J para. (2) of the 
Constitution, as mentioned above, is not understood comprehensively. Specifically for 
the human rights violation, having the Article 28J para. (2) of the Constitution itself can 
be problematic. It is problematic in the sense that since each right stipulated in the 
Constitution has a distinct demand, having the Article 28J para. (2) as the single and 
general rule limitation that applies to all provisions will not probably fulfill such 
demand or will potentially create almost-endless clash of interests. For example, 
having a “religious values” as one of the basis to limit rights will probably make the 
fulfillment of right to freedom of religion and beliefs become more complicated in a 
sense that such limitation will make a tension between religions, beliefs, and the values 
they uphold more likely to occur. In such tension, the Court’s judges are more likely to 
become the arbitrary power to determine which religious value(s) to be uphold. The 
possible consequences will be elaborated more in the Part II of this writing when 
discussing the lesson learned from the Court’s interpretation of Article 28J para. (2) of 
the Constitution in the IET Law-related rulings. 
To briefly sum up, it is important to study the interpretation of Article 28J para. (2) of 
the Constitution because through such interpretation, the Court upholds the 
constitutional values and democracy of Indonesia. Additionally, such interpretation 
has both a significant importance and possible consequences of having the Article 28J 
para. (2) of the Constitution as the general rule of limitation of rights especially to the 
human rights protection in Indonesia. 
 
2.  Method 
As mentioned above, this writing concerns about the limitation of rights in Indonesian 
legal context. Therefore, this writing sets the main question: What constitutes as 
limitation of rights in Indonesian legal context? In order to answer the main question, this 
writing sets three sub-questions namely:  
a) How does the limitation of rights is regulated under Article 28J paragraph (2) of 
the 1945 Constitution? 
b) How does the Constitutional Court of Indonesia interpret the Article 28J 
paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution? 
c) What are the lessons learned from perusing the interpretation of the Court on 
Article 28J paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution? 
This writing will employ legal method namely the interpretation of arguments in 
answering the above three questions. Meaning this writing will study the presented 
arguments with regard to the above three questions by looking into relevant legal 
instruments (e.g. the 1945 Constitution and the rulings of the Constitutional Court of 
Indonesia) and scholarly writings related to the issue. For the first sub-question, this 
writing will peruse the 1945 Constitution specifically Article 28J para. (2) of the 
Constitution. Moreover, this writing will explain Ruling 2-3/PUU-V/2007 in order to 
portray the significance of Article 28J para. (2) of the Constitution.  
For the second sub-question, this writing will specifically study the Court’s rulings in the 
constitutional reviews of the provision stipulated in the Information and Electronic 
Transaction Law (hereinafter, “IET Law”). The rulings are Ruling No. 50/PUU-
VI/2008, Ruling No. 2/PUU-VII/2009, Ruling No. 5/PUU-VIII/2010, Ruling No. 
52/PUU-XI/2013, and Ruling No. 20/PUU-XIV/2016. This writing also will compare 
those rulings to each other to portray the degree of variety of interpretation by the 
Court over the time. These rulings are chosen because, in these rulings, the tensions 
Hasanuddin Law Rev. 3(3): 290-306 
293 
 
between individual and public interest are apparent. For example the tension between 
the right to privacy and freedom of expression, and the tensions between freedom of 
expression and public order. In other words, these rulings are the relevant source for 
researching about the limitation of rights in Indonesian legal context. Moreover, this 
writing will further compare the interpretation of limitation of rights by the Court in its 
rulings to other standards of limitation in other human rights instruments such as 
European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter, “ECHR”) and International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter, “ICCPR”). This comparison aims to 
show what are the distinctive and similar features of limitation of human rights regime 
in Indonesia to the other regimes namely ECHR and ICCPR. 
For the third sub-question, this writing will first explain what the Court’s roles in 
Indonesian legal context in upholding the constitutional values and furthering the 
democracy of Indonesia. Then, this writing will analyze how does the interpretation of 
the Article 28J para. (2) of the 1945 Constitution relate to the Court’s role in Indonesia. 
Furthermore, this writing will discuss what are the possible consequences of the 
interpretation of the Court on the Article 28J para. (2) of the 1945 Constitution to the 
human rights protection in Indonesia.  
 
3.  Analysis and Discussion  
This part will discuss the issue of what constitutes as the limitation of rights in 
Indonesian legal context. To do so, this part will first explain the limitation of rights 
under the Article 28J para. (2) of the Constitution. Secondly, this part will discuss the 
rulings of the Court in the context of IET Law in order to know how does the Court 
interprets the Article 28J para. (2) of the Constitution so far. Additionally, this part will 
also discuss the comparative note between the Court’s interpretation on limitation of 
rights and other international human rights instruments namely ECHR and ICCPR. 
Thirdly, this part will describe the lesson learned from perusing the interpretation of 
Article 28J para. (2) of the Constitution by the Court. The lesson learned includes the 
relation between the role of the Court in upholding the constitutional values and 
furthering the democracy of Indonesia and the interpretation of the Article 28J para. (2) 
of the Constitution, and the possible consequences of such interpretation to the human 
rights protection in Indonesia. 
 
3.1.  Limitation of Rights under the Article 28J paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution  
This sub-part will explain the limitation of rights under the Article 28J para. (2) of the 
Constitution. Article 28J para. (2) of the Constitution stipulates that: “In exercising rights 
and freedom, every person must submit to the limitation that is determined by law/in 
accordance with law with the sole aim to guarantee the recognition and respect toward rights 
and freedom of others and to fulfill a just aim in accordance with the moral, religious values, 
security and public order consideration in a democratic society” (Unofficial translation by the 
author). 
Based on the literal stipulation of Article 28J para. 2 of the Constitution, there are at 
least four elements of justification in limiting the exercise of rights and freedom of a 
person in Indonesia. Those four elements are: 
a) determined by/in accordance with law. 
b) to guarantee the recognition and respect toward rights and freedom of others. 
c) to fulfill a just aim in accordance with the moral, religious values, security and 
public order consideration. 
d) in a democratic society. 
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It is still unclear whether these four elements are cumulative or not. Nevertheless, the 
Court often referred the Article 28J para. 2 of the Constitution for its entirety.6 As for 
the meaning of each elements, it will be elaborated more in sub-part 3.2 of this writing 
below. 
Regarding the significance of the Article 28J para. (2) of the Constitution, in Ruling 2-
3/PUU-V/2007 –a ruling about the constitutionality of death penalty provision, the 
Court explained that all the human rights provision from Article 28A to Article 28I of 
the Constitution submit to the limitation of rights stipulated in the Article 28J para. (1) 
and (2).7 However, in relation to this Ruling, it argued that in term of the non-
derogable rights mentioned in the Article 28I para. (1) of the Constitution -those rights 
including the right to life, the right not to be tortured, the right to freedom of thoughts 
and beliefs, the right to the freedom of religions, the right not to be enslaved, Article 
28J of the Constitution is not applicable to those non-derogable rights.8  
 
3.2.  The Constitutional Court’s Interpretation on the Article 28J paragraph (2) of the 
1945 Constitution 
This sub-part will discuss the Court’s interpretation on the Article 28J para. (2) of the 
Constitution in the Court’s ruling. Furthermore, this sub-part will also analyze the 
comparison between the Court’s interpretation on limitation of rights and other 
international human rights instruments namely ECHR and ICCPR. 
 
3.2.1. A Case Analysis: IET Law-related rulings 
The Court’s ruling that will be studied here is the IET Law-related rulings namely 
Ruling No. 50/PUU-VI/2008 (hereinafter, “Ruling I”), Ruling No. 2/PUU-VII/2009 
(hereinafter, “Ruling II”), Ruling No. 5/PUU-VIII/2010 (hereinafter, “Ruling III”), 
Ruling No. 52/PUU-XI/2013 (hereinafter, “Ruling IV”), and Ruling No. 20/PUU-
XIV/2016 (hereinafter, “Ruling V”). 
 
i. Ruling I 
In Ruling I, the claimants challenged the constitutionality of Article 27 para. (3) and 
Article 45 para. (1) of IET Law. The former Article stipulates about the prohibition on 
defamation and the latter regulates about the penalty when a violation of the former 
occurs. These two Articles were challenged against the Article 28D para. (1), Article 
28E para. (2) and (3), and Article 28F of the Constitution. However, the claimants’ 
arguments on these constitutional Articles per se are not the major interest in this 
writing. This writing is more interested in the way the claimants used Article 28J para. 
(2) of the Constitution to emphasize their main point. In essence, the main point of the 
claimants were the aforementioned IET Law provisions jeopardizes the claimants’ right 
to freedom expression and/or press. With regard to the Article 28J para. (2) of the 
Constitution, the claimants argued that: (a) the claimants acknowledged that the 
Article 28J para. (2) of the Constitution provides a justification to limit the exercise of 
																																								 																				
6  See further Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia, Ruling No. 50/PUU-VI/2008, Ruling 
No. 2/PUU-VII/2009, Ruling No. 5/PUU-VIII/2010, Ruling No. 52/PUU-XI/2013, and Ruling No. 
20/PUU-XIV/2016. 
7  See Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia, Ruling 2-3/PUU-V/2007, p. 412 
8  Osgar S. Matompo (2014), “Pembatasan Terhadap Hak Asasi Manusia dalam Perspektif Keadaan 
Darurat,” Jurnal Media Hukum, 21 (1): 57-72. 
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certain rights9, and (b) nonetheless, if such limitation is preventing the advancement of 
human rights protection, even though such limitation is carried out in accordance with 
law, such limitation is still violating the human rights at stake.10 Against these 
arguments, the Court said that though there is a guarantee of freedom of expression 
and/or press, it does not necessarily mean that the exercise of such freedom cannot be 
limited and as such, the state has the power to limit the exercise of such freedom.11 The 
Court then referred to the Article 28J para. (2) of the Constitution as one of the 
justifications in the Constitution for such state power and the limitation that the state 
wants to carry out.12 
Additionally, the Court’s interpretation on Article 28J para. (2) of the Constitution can 
actually be seen throughout its consideration in Ruling I. As explained in the previous 
sub-part, the Article 28J para. (2) of the Constitution contains four prerequisites 
elements of limitation namely: (a) determined by/in accordance with law, (b) to guarantee 
the recognition and respect toward rights and freedom of others, (c) to fulfill a just aim in 
accordance with the moral, religious values, security and public order consideration, and (d) in 
a democratic society.  
In Ruling I, with regard to determined by/in accordance with law, the Court says that the 
Articles of IET Law challenged in this constitutional review are legal provisions that 
meant to balance between the individual’s right to freedom of expression and the 
protection of (an)other individual’s dignity.13 That being said, in such consideration, 
the Court indirectly also emphasizes that the Articles of IET Law challenged in this 
constitutional review are meant to guarantee the recognition and respect toward rights and 
freedom of others. As for the just aim element, in this Ruling I, the Court takes into 
account a moral consideration. The Court explained that Indonesia does not recognize 
the separation of morality within an individual –whether it is a civil morality, a 
communal one or an institutional one- but rather such individual is seen as a holistic 
being namely as a person, a social being and a citizen in which such individual has a 
dignity and that dignity is a bliss coming from the Almighty God.14 The consequence of 
viewing an individual person and his or her dignity this way, as the Court argued, is 
that the dignity of that individual person is important especially in a society that 
upholds democratic value like Indonesia and as such, the dignity of that individual 
person cannot be jeopardized by negative activities like defamation.15 In other words, 
the Court says that not only a dignity of a person has a moral importance but also in a 
democratic society, such dignity takes such significance that it must and will be 
protected. Moreover, in Ruling I, the Court also took into account the security and 
public order consideration that in an online world, there is a chance for using the 
advancement of technology to commit crimes and other negative activities that 





9 Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia, Ruling No. 50/PUU-VI/2008, p. 18-19. 
10 Id. 
11 Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia, Supra note 9, para. 3.16.6-3.16.7. 
12 Id. 
13 Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia, Supra note 9, para 3.16.3.  
14 Id, para. 3.15.1. 
15 Id, para. 3.15.2. 
16 Id, para. 3.15.7-3.15.8. 
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ii. Ruling II 
In Ruling II, the claimants challenged the constitutionality of Article 27 para. (3) of IET 
Law. The Article was challenged against the Article 1 para. (2), Article 1 para. (3), 
Article 27 para. (1), Article 28, Article 28C para. (1) and (2), Article 28D para. (1), Article 
28E para. (2) and (3), Article 28F, and Article 28G para. (1) of the Constitution. Again, 
this writing is not interested in the arguments against these constitutional Articles per 
se but rather to the claimants’ argument on limitation of rights. With regard to the 
limitation of rights, the claimants argued that though the right to freedom of 
expression is a part of derogable rights, the limitation of it must be in accordance with 
law and in a circumstance where the limitation is really needed.17 To support this 
argument, the claimants referred to the ICCPR and its General Comment 10 that 
essensially says there must be a justification of limitation of rights from the member 
states.18 Furthermore, the claimants argued that in the context of Article 27 para. (3) of 
IET Law, the Article does not really fulfill such need and there is a little justification for 
it as the Article itself will potentially cause a violation of human rights.19 Unlike the 
Ruling I, the claimants in Ruling II does not explicitly cited the Article 28J para. (2) of 
the Constitution in their claims. 
Toward the claimants’ argument on limitation of rights, the Court argued that the 
Article 27 para. (3) of IET Law is not meant to unreasonably limit the right to freedom 
of expression or curtailing it for that matter20 but rather to achieve the balance between 
right to freedom of expresion and right to privacy including one’s right to the 
protection of one’s honor and dignity so that one can live as a blissful human being.21 
Moreover, the Court added, the balance between the right to freedom of expression 
and the right to privacy is needed in order to make the internet or cyberspace as a place 
that not only people freely express themselves but also, in so doing, people respect 
other people’s privacy including their honor and dignity.22  
In Ruling II, the Court does not explicitly cited the Article 28J para. (2) of the 
Constitution and rather it referred to Article 28G para. (1) of the Constitution on the 
right to privacy.23 The Court’s reference to the Article 28G para. (1) of the Constitution 
and the argument on balancing right to freedom of expression and right to privacy can 
be seen as the Court’s move in limiting the right to freedom of expression itself and 
indirectly relate its argument to the basis of limitation provided in the Article 28J para. 
(2) of the Constitutional namely the limitation in order to guarantee the recognition and 
respect toward rights and freedom of others. Last but not least, the inexplicit argument from 
the Court with regard to the Article 28J para. (2) of the Constitution might be 
connected to the Court’s note on the case that the Court noted Ruling II is essensially 
similar to Ruling I -in term of the Article of IET Law that was challenged and the 
argument on freedom of expression- therefore the Court did not feel the necessity to 




17 Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia, Ruling No. 2/PUU-VII/2009, para. 149. 
18 Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia, Supra note 17, para. 160. 
19 Id, para. 161-162. 
20 Id, para. 3.17. 
21 Id. 
22 Id, para. 3.18. 
23 Supra note 20. 
24 Constitutonal Court of the Republic of Indonesia, Supra note 17, para. 3.14-3.15. 
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iii. Ruling III 
In Ruling III, the claimants challenged the constitutionality of Article 31 para. (4) of 
IET Law. This Article stipulates that the procedures of interception/surveillance will 
be further regulated by the Government Regulation. This Article was challenged 
against the Article 28G para. (1) and Article 28J para. (2) of the Constitution. In this 
case, the claimants argued that the procedures of interception/surveillance must be 
done with the Law instead of Government Regulation.25 Moreover, the claimants 
argued that having a Government Regulation will (potentially) violate the claimants’ 
right to privacy guaranteed in the Article 28G para. (1) of the Constitution and the 
prerequisites of limitation stipulated in the Article 28J para. (2) of the Constitution.26 As 
mentioned before, in analyzing the Court’s ruling, this writing is interested in the 
claimants’ argument on limitation of rights and since the claimants in Ruling III 
presented a direct argument on the Article 28J para. (2) of the Constitution, this writing 
will put closer look to such argument. 
With regard to the Article 28J para. (2) of the Constitution, the claimants presented at 
least two major arguments. The first one is the claimants acknowledged that right to 
privacy is a part of derogable rights and it is justifiable for the state to limit it.27 
Nonetheless, the limitation must not be regulated by the Government Regulation as 
stipulated in the Article 31 para. (4) of IET Law.28 Rather the limitation must be 
regulated by a Law since other kind of laws such as Ministerial Regulation and 
Government Regulation are not enough to sufficiently regulate the interception/ 
surveillance procedures.29 To support this argument, the claimants referred to the 
Article 28J para. (2) of the Constitution that says a limitation of right must be determined 
by/in accordance with law. Secondly, the claimants proposed that, having in mind the 
Article 28J para. (2) of the Constitution and the gravity of the violation of right to 
privacy when interception/surveillance is carried out, the procedures of interception/ 
surveillance themselves and any necessary requirements for that matter must be 
regulated under the Criminal Procedural Law or a new Law on interception/ 
surveillance.30  
Toward the claimants’ argument, the Court explained two things. Firstly, the Court 
agrees with the claimants’ argument that right to privacy is a part of derogable rights 
and as such, it can be limited.31 Based on this line of thinking, even though the 
interception/surveillance hampers one’s right to privacy, it can be carried out insofar it 
fulfills the criteria in the Article 28J para. (2) of the Constitution.32 One of the criteria is 
the determined by/in accordance with law. In this case, the Court seems to agree with the 
claimants’ interpretation of the word “law” (undang-undang) that it refers to specific 
form of law namely the “Law” (Undang-Undang) and in relation to the interception/ 
surveillance, the Court agrees with the claimants that interception/surveillance can 
only be regulated by the Law not by the Government Regulation. The Court explained 
that Law is more suitable form of law rather than Government Regulation because the 
Government Regulation is only an administrative regulation and as such, it does not 
																																								 																				
25 Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia, Ruling No. 5/PUU-VIII/2010, para. 25-para. 26. 
26 Id, para. 31. 
27 Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia, Supra note 25, para. 49. 
28 Id. 
29 Id, para. 49 and para. 53. 
30 Id, para. 54. 
31 Id, para. 3.21. 
32 Id, para. 3.24. 
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have the quality of regulating something that will potentially have an impact on one’s 
constitutional rights which in this case is the impact of carrying out interception/ 
surveillance to one’s right to privacy.33 
Secondly, as for the suggestion from the claimants, the Court says it agrees with the 
claimants that there is, in fact, a need for further regulation of interception/ 
surveillance.34 To support this agreement, the Court explained that it has observed that 
there are indeed laws and regulations on interception/surveillance but that laws and 
regulations are problematic in a sense that it still lack certain details such as the exact 
period of interception/surveillance and the limit of access to the result of 
interception/surveillance.35 To emphasize its point, the Court also quoted its own 
ruling namely Ruling No. 066/PUU-I/2003 in which through this ruling, the Court 
underlined the need for further regulation in order to prevent abuse of power when 
the state authority conducts an interception or a surveillance.36 
 
iv. Ruling IV 
In Ruling IV, the claimant challenged the constitutionality of Article 28 para. (2) of IET 
Law against the Article 28E para. (2) and Article 28F of the Constitution. Article 28 
para. (2) of IET Law regulates about the prohibition on spreading informations that 
aim to incite hate towards an individual or a certain group based on their ethnicity, 
religions, races, and intergroups. The claimant argued that this Article 28 para. (2) of 
IET Law hampers the claimant’s right to freedom of expression. In this ruling, the 
Court simply disagreed with the claimant in making the Article 28 para. (2) of IET Law 
unconstitutional. It is because the Court viewed that even though one has the right to 
freedom of expression as stipulated in the Constitution, such right can be limited in a 
way that justified by the Article 28J para. (2) of the Constitution.37 The Court added 
that spreading informations that the Article 28 para. (2) of IET Law is in accordance 
with the aim to protect honor and dignity of the nation and it is inline with the value of 
the Almighty God as there is no religion that justify the propagation of hatred.38 In this 
ruling, rather than elaborate more on the Article 28J para. (2) of the Constitution, the 
Court seems want to emphasize the importance of having the Article 28 para. (2) of IET 
Law in keeping the nation peace and safe.  
 
v. Ruling V 
In Ruling V, the claimant challenged the constitutionality of Article 5 para. (1) and (2) 
and Article 44 letter b of IET Law. These Articles were challenged against the Article 1 
para. (3), Article 28D para. (1), and Article 28G para. (1) of the Constitution. Article 5 
para. (1) and (2) of IET Law is essentially about the use of electronic information 
and/or electronic document as a legitimate evidence and the usage of such electronic 
pieces is a part of the expansion of existing procedural laws in Indonesia. As for Article 
44 letter b of IET Law, the article is basically emphasize the use of electronic 
information and/or electronic document as a legitimate evidence. The core issue in this 
case is whether the recording obtained by the state authority can be used as a 
legitimate evidence against the claimant since, as the claimant argued, the 
																																								 																				
33 Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia, Supra Note 25, para. 3.23. 
34 Id. 
35 Id, para. 3.21-3.22. 
36 Id, para. 3.24. 
37 Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia, Ruling No. 52/PUU-XI/2013, para. 3.12 – 3.13. 
38 Id, para. 3.14. 
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aforementioned IET Law provides a little guidance to the use of such recordings as a 
legitimate evidence.39  
The interesting part of this ruling is that the claimant emphasizes the state’s obligation 
to fulfill human rights in which such fulfillment is in a form of having a sufficient laws 
and regulations -as stipulated in the Article 28I para. (5) of the Constitution.40 The 
claimant did not make direct reference to the Article 28J para. (2) of the Constitution.  
Toward the claimant’s argument, the Court responded that there is indeed not yet a 
specific Law that regulated about interception or recording.41 To support this response, 
the Court referred to its previous rulings namely Ruling No. 006/PUU-I/2003 and 
Ruling III as these two rulings have already elaborated the existing laws that regulate 
on interception/surveillance but yet such laws are not sufficient enough to fulfill the 
criteria on limitation in Article 28J para. (2) of the Constitution. This way, the Court 
was partially agreed on the claimant’s argument on the insufficiency of the afore-
mentioned IET Law provisions.42 Nevertheless, there was one dissenting opinion from 
a judge in this case in relation to the Article 28J para. (2) of the Constitution. The judge 
said that IET Law actually have satisfied the criteria in the Article 28J para. (2) of the 
Constitution on having a law to regulate a recording -e.g. to determine whether it can 
be used as a legitimate evidence or not- and as such, there is no need a further 
interpretation on the aforementioned IET Law provisions.43 
 
vi. Analysis of Ruling I-Ruling V 
This analysis part will comprise of the comparison of above rulings (Ruling I - Ruling 
V) namely what are the differences and similiraties between them. This analysis part 
will also summarize the Court’s interpretation on the four elements of justification of 
limitation of rights prescribed in the Article 28J para. (2) of the Constitution. 
Based on the above explanation about the Court’s rulings on IET Law-related 
constitutional review, there are differences and similarities between those five rulings. 
The differences and similarities are as follow: 
• The first difference is about the core issue in the rulings. Ruling I and Ruling II are 
focused on the contention between the issue of defamation, the right to privacy, 
and the right to freedom of expression; Ruling III and Ruling V are focused on the 
contention between the issue of interception/surveillance and the right to privacy; 
and Ruling IV are focused on the contention between the issue of online hate 
speech and the right to freedom of expression. 
• The second difference is the focus of the Court when interpreting the Article 28J 
para. (2) of the Constitution. Such focus depends on the core issue of the rulings. In 
Ruling I and Ruling II, the Court elaborates its interpretation on Article 28J para. 
(2) of the Constitution more on the importance of guaranteeing the recognition and 
respect toward rights and freedom of others. The Court agreed with the claimants for 
most of the times that the right to freedom of expression is important. Nevertheless, 
the Court emphasized that the protection of right to privacy also has an equal 
importance. Since both the right to freedom of expression and right to privacy are 
pivotal, the Court then explained the need to balance those two. The balancing is 
																																								 																				
39 Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia, Ruling No. 20/PUU-XIV/2016, p. 10-11. 
40 Id, p. 89-90. 
41 Id, para. 3.10. 
42 Id, p. 97. 
43 Id, p. 103-104. 
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possible to occur if the Article 27 para. 3 of IET Law is in place. As for other 
justification for limiting a right namely to fulfill a just aim in accordance with the 
moral, religious values, security and public order consideration, and in a democratic 
society, in Ruling I and Ruling II, the Court provided explanation that the 
balancing between the right to freedom of expression and the right to privacy 
serves a just aim especially the moral, security and public order consideration. The 
Court also explained that such balancing is the essential elements of a democratic 
society like Indonesia. In Ruling III and Ruling V, the Court elaborates its 
interpretation on Article 28J para. (2) of the Constitution more on the justification of  
determined by/in accordance with law. In Ruling III and Ruling V, the Court 
explained that though interception/surveillance is regulated in various laws in 
Indonesia, such laws are problematic as they lack certain pivotal details. Here, the 
Court interpreted that determined by/in accordance with law is not only that there 
must exist a law that regulate certain matter but also such law must be adequate 
and provide details that reduce the possibility of having an abuse of power by state 
authority. In Ruling III and Ruling V, the Court emphasized the importance to 
prevent the abuse of power by state authority when one’s right to privacy is being 
compromised by the interception/surveillance. In Ruling IV, the Court was not so 
much elaborate the Article 28J para. (2) of the Constitution. It seems that the Court 
was quite surprise that Article 28 para. (2) of IET Law was constitutionally 
challenged as the Court viewed such Article is pivotal in regulating hate speech in 
Indonesia. 
• The first similarity between those rulings are the issue at stake involved a recent 
development of technology either it is about the internet or the usage of 
interception/surveillance. In those rulings, the Court managed to balance the 
development of technology with the constitutional values in the 1945 Constitution. 
The Court managed to do so in a way that on hand hand, the Court acknowledged 
the development of technology that occur, and on the other hand, the Court 
explained that inasmuch it values the development of technology, such 
development must not forget to balance the rights at stake in accordance with the 
Constitution especially Article 28J para. (2) of the Constitution. 
• The second similarity is the significance of the right to privacy of a person and its 
relation to the Article 28J para. (2) of the Constitution. It is often said that in the 
light of the rapid development of technology such as the use of internet and the so-
called necessity of interception/surveillance for security, the right to privacy is 
essentially no longer “exist”. However, in the Court’s rulings on IET Law-related 
provisions, the rulings shown the contrary that the right to privacy is still “exist” 
and the Constitution provides a guarantee to protect such right. For example, in 
Ruling III and Ruling V, the Court focused the explanation on protecting one’s 
honor and dignity as a human being in which, though the right to privacy of a 
person can be limited in accordance with the Article 28J para. (2) of the 
Constitution, such limitation must not compromise the honor and dignity of that 
person. This example shows that inasmuch the Article 28J para. (2) of the 
Constitution limit the human rights at stake, in term of the right to privacy and 
interpreting the Article 28J para. (2) of the Constitution, the Court put emphasis on 
the protection of one’s honor and dignity against the interception/surveillance 
activities. 
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Other than above differences and similarities of the IET Law-related rulings, it is also 
paramount to highlight the Court’s interpretation of the four elements in justifying the 
limitation of rights in those rulings. Following is the Court’s interpretation: 
a) determined by/in accordance with law 
In Ruling I and Ruling II as well as Ruling IV, the Court was not focus in 
interpreting this element. However, in Ruling III and Ruling V, the Court put 
more elaboration what it means by limitation must be determined by/in 
accordance with law. The Court interpreted that: (a) the word “law” here refers to 
specific form of law namely “Law” (Undang-Undang), and (b) in order to limit 
certain rights, the mere existence of law is not enough that such law must be 
adequate and provide details in order to prevent the abuse of power from the 
state authorities. 
b) to guarantee the recognition and respect toward rights and freedom of others 
From Ruling I to Ruling V, the Court dealt with contention of various rights. 
For example, when discussing the importance of the right to freedom of 
expression in Ruling I and Ruling II, the Court also put emphasis on the 
importance of the right to privacy. Another example is in Ruling III and 
Ruling V, when discussing the practice of interception/surveillance, the Court 
put a highlight on the protection to the right to privacy.  
c) to fulfill a just aim in accordance with the moral, religious values, security and 
public order consideration 
The interpretation of this element is more apparent the Ruling I and Ruling IV 
compare to other rulings that are studied in this part. In Ruling I, the Court 
elaborated on the moral consideration and its relation to the right to privacy. In 
the context of Ruling I, the moral consideration is to see a person’s dignity as a 
bliss from the Almighty God and as such, the dignity of that person must and 
will be protected. Furthermore, in Ruling I, as explained above, the Court also 
gives explanation on the security and public order in term of using the internet or 
cyberspace that without a proper regulation such as Article 27 para. (3) of IET 
Law, security and public order can be compromised. As for Ruling IV, the 
Court highlighted that the prohibition on spreading informations that can incite 
hatred is needed to preserve the unity and peace of Indonesia. As for the term 
religious values, based on Ruling I – Ruling V, this writing does not found any 
interpretation of it. It is because in the rulings analyzed in this writing, the issue 
is not so much focus on the religions and beliefs in Indonesia. Further look to 
the relevant rulings of Court’s about the interpretation of religious values is 
needed. The relevant rulings here include Ruling No. 84/PUU-X/2012 on 
Blasphemy Law and Ruling No. 68/PUU-XII/2014 on Marriage Law. 
d) in a democratic society 
In Ruling I – Ruling V, the Court does not specifically explain what it means 
by the phrase of in a democratic society or what constitutes as a democratic society. 
Nevertheless, in Ruling I, the Court noted one element of a democratic society 
namely the protection of one’s right to privacy including one’s honor and 
dignity. Furthermore, even though the Court does not specifically explain the 
meaning of in a democratic society, one could see that throughout Ruling I – 
Ruling V, the Court puts efforts in emphasizing that Indonesia is a democratic 
society and as such, Indonesia respects human rights. The respect is not only 
about fulfilling certain right but also balancing the rights themselves which in 
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the case of IET Law-related rulings, the balance needed is mostly between the 
right to privacy and the right to freedom of expression.  
To briefly sum up the analysis on the interpretation of the Court on Article 28J para. (2) 
of the Constitution in the context of IET Law-related rulings, the analysis shows that 
the rulings have differences in term of the rights at stake and the focus of the Court 
when interpreting Article 28J para. (2) of the Constitution. For example, Ruling I and II 
focus on the aspect of rights and freedom of others and the consideration for a just aim, 
Ruling III and V focus on the aspect of whether existing laws are fulfilling the criteria 
of “law” prescribed in Article 28J para. (2) of the Constitution, and Ruling IV focus on 
the broad sense of peace and unity. Other than differences, those rulings have 
similarities. The similarities are those rulings focus on the issue related to development 
of technology namely the usage of internet or cyberspace and the emphasis of the right 
to privacy of Indonesian people. Moreover, the analysis also shows the interpretation 
of the Court toward the four elements in justifying limitation of rights in the Article 28J 
para. (2) of the Constitution in those IET Law-related rulings.  
 
3.2.2. A Comparative Note: ECHR and ICCPR 
This comparative part will explain the limitation of rights under the ECHR and ICCPR 
regime. Since the rights discussed in this writing are the right to privacy and the right 
to freedom of expression, this comparative note will focus on what the ECHR and 
ICCPR says about the limitation of rights in the context of the right to privacy and the 
right to freedom of expression. 
 
i. ECHR 
a) Right to privacy 
The right to privacy is guaranteed under the Article 8 of ECHR. Article 8 para. (1) of 
ECHR stipulates that “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence”. Furthermore, Article 8 para. (2) of ECHR stipulates that 
“There shall be no interference by a public authority witht the exercise of this right except such 
as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interest of national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedom of 
others”. Based on this two Articles, it can be seen that (a) ECHR guarantees the right to 
privacy and (b) the right to privacy in the ECHR regime itself is not an absolute right 
and it can be limited under the conditions stipulated in the Article 8 para. (2) of the 
ECHR.44 Nevertheless, it is important to note that under the ECHR system, there is the 
so-called margin of appreciation. This margin of appreciation means that “in 
determining whether measures taken by the States are compatible with Article 8 the State is 
afforded certain degree of discretion”.45  
The European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter, “ECtHR”), when assessing the case 
allegedly related to the Article 8 right, will have two stages of assessment. In the first 
stage, the ECtHR focuses on the Article 8 para. (1). The ECtHR asks whether the case 
fall within the scope of Article 8 para. (1) and if so, the ECtHR asks whether there is a 
positive obligation done by the State to respect the right guaranteed in the Article 8 
para. (1) and if there is such positive obligation, the ECtHR asks whether such action 
																																								 																				
44 Council of Europe (2001), “Human rights handbooks No. 1”, Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 
https://rm.coe.int/168007ff47 last accessed 1 September 2017, p. 6 
45  Id, p. 7-8. 
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fulfill the Article 8 right.46 In the second stage, the ECtHR focuses on the Article 8 para. 
(2). The ECtHR asks whether there is an interference with Article 8 right and if there is, 
then the ECtHR asks whether such interference is in accordance with law, does the 
interference pursue a legitimate aim, and whether such interference is necessary in a 
democratic society. This second stage of question determines whether the limitation of 
the Article 8 can be justified or not. 
As this writing is interested more in the limitation of rights under the ECHR regime, 
this writing will elaborate more on the second stage of questions asked by the ECtHR. 
In the Human Rights Handbook No. 1, it is explained what constitutes as in accordance 
with law, pursue a legitimate aim and necessary in a democratic society. The criteria in 
accordance with law means that the interference of Article 8 right must have a legal basis 
and such legal basis –the law in question- must be “…sufficiently precise and contain a 
measure of protection against arbitrariness.”47 As for the criteria pursue a legitimate aim, the 
Article 8 para. (2) of ECHR provides the aims -i.e. national security and public safety- 
and it is the matter of the member States to make a convincing case before the ECtHR 
on why such aim is pursued and the justification of interference based on that aim.48 
Lastly, for the criteria necessary in a democratic society, this criteria is essentially about 
“…the balance achieved between the rights of the individual and the public interest…”49 In 
striking the balance, the ECtHR applies a proportionality test namely a test that entails 
“...balancing the rights of the individual and the interest of the State…”.50 The ECtHR also 
takes into account the margin of appreciation when assessing whether the interference 
is justifiable under the Article 8 para. (2) of ECHR.51 
 
b) Right to freedom of expression 
As for the right to the freedom of expression, ECHR guarantees this right under the 
Article 10. Article 10 para. (1) of ECHR at least guarantees three parts of the right to the 
freedom of expression. Those three parts are “freedom to hold opinions; freedom to impart 
information and ideas; and freedom to receive information and ideas”.52 Furthermore, Article 
10 para. (2) of ECHR regulates about the limitation of the right to freedom of 
expression.  
As this writing is more interested in the limitation of rights, this writing will then 
elaborate more on the Article 10 para. (2) of ECHR. According to the Human Rights 
Handbook No. 2, with regard to the Article 10 para. (2) of ECHR there are three 
cumulative conditions of which the exercise of the freedom of expression can be 
justified. Those three conditions are “the interference (meaning “formality”, “condition”, 
“restriction” or “penalty”) is prescribed by law; the interference is aimed at protecting one or 
more of the following interests or values; national security; territorial integrity; public safety; 
prevention of disorder or crime; protection of health; morals; reputation or rights of others; 
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, and; maintaining the authority 
and impartiality of the judiciary; the interference is necessary in a democratic society”.53 Based 
																																								 																				
46  Id, p. 9. 
47  Id, p. 25-26. 
48  Id, p. 30. 
49  Id, p. 31. 
50  Council of Europe (2001), “Human rights handbooks No. 1”, Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 
https://rm.coe.int/168007ff47 last accessed 1 September 2017, Supra note 49. 
51  Id. 
52  Council of Europe (2001), “Human rights handbooks No.2”, Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 
https://rm.coe.int/168007ff48 last accessed 1 September 2017, p. 7. 
53  Id, p. 29. 
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on the stipulation in the Article 10 para. (2) of ECHR and these three cumulative 
conditions, one can see that the limitation on the right to freedom of expression is 
different from the one on the right to privacy under the ECHR regime. 
 
ii. ICCPR 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter, “ICCPR”) is one 
of the important international human rights instruments. The ICCPR contains a 
guarantee on civil and political rights which include the right to privacy and the right 
to freedom of expression. 
Under the ICCPR regime, the guarantee of the right to privacy is stipulated under the 
Article 17. Article 17 para. (1) of ICCPR stipulates that “No one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to 
unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation”. Furthermore, Article 17 para. (2) of the 
ICCPR stipulates that “Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such 
interference or attack”. Based on these two Articles, it can be seen that (a) ICCPR 
guarantees the right to privacy and (b) such right is not absolute as it can be limited by 
a lawful interference.  
As for the right to freedom of expression, the guarantee of this right is stipulated under 
the Article 19 of the ICCPR. There are two elements of the right to freedom of 
expression. The first one is the freedom to hold opinion without any interference as 
stipulated in Article 19 para. (1). The second one is the freedom stipulated in the Article 
19 para. (2). The Article says “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this 
right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, 
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any 
other media of his choice”. The freedom of expression in the Article 19 para. (2) can be 
limited as the justification of limitation is prescribed in the Article 19 para. (3) of 
ICCPR. The Article says that the Article 19 para. (2) rights are subject to certain 
limitations in which the limitations must be done only if such limitations are 
“…provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputation of others; (b) 
For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or 
morals.” 
 
iii. Comparison between Indonesia, ECHR, and ICCPR Regime 
There are similarities and differences between the Indonesian understanding of 
limitation of rights and the other regimes which in this case are ECHR and ICCPR. The 
similarities in those three regimes are essentially that limitation of certain rights must 
be prescribed by law and such limitation must pursue (just) aims. Nevertheless, there 
are at least three differences in understanding the standards of limiting certain rights 
between Indonesia, ECHR, and ICCPR regime. The first difference is the 
understanding of “prescribed by law”. For example: in Indonesian understanding, the 
term “law” refers to specific form of law namely “Law” (Undang-Undang), whereas in 
the ECHR regime, the term “law” excludes the administrative policy. As for the ICCPR 
regime, the term “law” could be laws made by the parliament and excludes the 
traditional or other kind of customary law.54 The second difference is the “variety” of 
aim and consideration across the mentioned regimes. For example, in Indonesian 
regime, one of the consideration on limiting certain rights is the consideration of 
																																								 																				
54  See United Nations (2011), “General Comment 34 Article 19 Freedom of opinions and expressions”, 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/gc34.pdf last accessed 1 September 2017. 
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upholding religion values. This consideration is not apparent both in the ECHR and 
ICCPR. The last difference is the provision of limitation of rights itself. In Indonesian 
regime, Article 28J para. (2) applies as the general rule and all the human rights 
provisions in the Constitution are subjected to the limitation prescribed there. Unlike 
Indonesia, for the right to privacy and the right to freedom of expression, ECHR and 
ICCPR has different provision of limiting each right. For example in ECHR regime, the 
provision to limit the right to privacy e.g. Article 8 para. (2) of ECHR is different from 
the provision to limit the exercise of freedom of expression e.g. Article 10 para (2) of 
ECHR. One of different aspects in those provisions are the aim to limit the exercise of 
freedom of expression is way more elaborated in comparison to the right to privacy. 
 
3.3.  Lessons Learned from The Constitutional Court’s Interpretation on the Article 
28J paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution 
There are at least two lessons here. Firstly, it is about the relation between the role of 
the Court in Indonesia and the Court’s interpretation of the 28J para. (2) of the 
Constitution. As explained above, the Court has the role as the guardian of 
Constitution. Meaning that the Court is the one who uphold the Constitution and its 
values for the sake’s of advancing the democracy and human rights protection in 
Indonesia. This role is strongly related to the way Court interprets the provisions in the 
Constitution which in the context of this writing is Article 28J para. (2) of the 
Constitution. Based on the analysis on the Court’s interpretation on the mentioned 
Article in IET Law-related rulings, the Court put its efforts to balance the rights at stake 
namely the right to privacy and freedom of expression. The Court also take into 
account the interest of the state, for example, in carrying interception/surveillance. In 
such interpretation, the Court also put efforts in balancing between the development in 
the society which in this case is the usage of internet or cyberspace and the preserved 
constitutional values in the Constitution. That being said, the lesson learned here is 
that in order to advance democracy and human right protection in Indonesia, it is 
important to both look at the rights at stake and the development of the society and to 
put balance between rights, the development of the society, and the constitutional 
values of the Constitution.  
Secondly, it is about the possible consequences of such interpretation to the human 
rights protection in Indonesia. As described above, there are possible consequences of 
having a single and general rule of limitation of rights. One possible consequence is 
that as each right has specific demand, having a general rule to limit it might dismiss 
the specific demand put by each right. Another possible consequence is that the 
considerations of limiting certain rights in the Article 28J para. (2) might not be 
compatible to each right guaranteed in the 1945 Constitution. This writing has given 
the example of “religious values” vis-à-vis the freedom of religion and beliefs. Last 
possible consequence is that as this writing found it is still unclear whether the 
requirements for limitation in Article 28J para. (2) is cumulative or not, such 
unclearness might create a possibility to cherry-pick the justification and therefore such 
justification is prone to abuse. 
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4.  Conclusion 
The limitation of rights is to be found in the Article 28J para. (2) of the Constitution. 
The Article consists of four elements in justifying the limitation of rights. Those four 
elements are determined by/in accordance with law, to guarantee the recognition and respect 
toward rights and freedom of others, to fulfill a just aim in accordance with the moral, religious 
values, security and public order consideration, and in a democratic society. To know more 
about the meaning of these elements, this writing has studied the Court’s ruling in IET 
Law-related claims as elaborated in the Part II of this writing. Furthermore, Indonesian 
regime of limitation of rights is different from the ECHR and ICCPR regime in term of 
the understanding of the term “law”, the (just) aims, and the provision on limitation 
itself in which, unlike ECHR and ICCPR, Indonesia has a single and general provision 
of limitation namely Article 28J para. (2) of the Constitution. Last but not least, this 
writing has explored what are the lesson learned from studying the Court’s 
interpretation in relation to the Court’s role as the guardian of the Constitution and the 
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